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Edward Snowden’s revelations in 2013 about the nature and scale of data-gathering in the two 
intelligence agencies, the NSA in the US and its UK sister agency, GCHQ, added a new dimension to a 
debate already underway about the transformation of intelligence-gathering in a Big Data age. There 
is no doubt that Snowden’s revelations provided the bow-wave of a fundamentally critical and anti-
state stance on the intelligence questions in hand. Such a critical stance is reflected in much of the 
academic literature about Big Data. In this chapter, such concerns are critically appraised.  
The core theme is much of the critical discourse is that of “panoptic panic” described by Lyon (2014, 
p.6), in which the citizens of liberal democracies increasingly feel threatened by the descent of their 
societies into an Orwellian dystopia of “mass surveillance” (itself, a contested notion about which 
more below). There is a sense of creeping anxiety to match the supposedly creeping powers of state 
intelligence gatherers, whereby increasingly sophisticated techniques can become more pre-emptive 
and predictive in their stance, with all the attendant risks of misdiagnosis of miscreants leading to 
wrongful imprisonment, or worse. We are moving, say the critics, into the sort of “pre-crime” 
nightmare that has been the realm of movies hitherto (Minority Report, Robocop). And this is to say 
nothing of the risks of a state abusing its increasingly powerful capabilities for political or corrupt 
purposes.  
Also at the core of the critical debate is the perennial question about the balancing of security against 
freedom in a modern liberal democracy. As transnational threats such as organised crime and 
terrorism take root, are we at risk of becoming a paranoid “risk society” in Ulrich Beck’s 
conceptualisation (Beck, 2002)? As the state capitalises on sophisticated data-gathering and data-
modelling opportunities, are we doing the work of the enemies of democracy for them by turning full 
circle into a Stasi-like surveillance society? In Beck’s analysis, prediction and risk are interrelated 
concepts: fear of the latter leads to an increasing desire for capability in the former, to attempt to 
block risks before they happen (Kerr and Earle, 2003, p.68). Such fundamental questions about the 
desired nature of modern democratic society could hardly be more important, and Big Data may be 
posing new and particularly challenging questions in the debate. 
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Epistemological issues 
Much of the academic discussion in this area grapples the epistemological shift that Big Data 
supposedly demands. Big Data is not just about handling data in traditional ways but at much greater 
volumes. Instead, normative thinking suggests that Big Data opens up a whole new set of techniques 
and capabilities which move data analysis away from a retrospective building of links between entities 
and more towards more pre-emptive and predictive possibilities. The whole paradigm of analysis and 
its outcomes start to be redefined.  
In the criminal intelligence sphere, such possibilities were noted relatively early in the 1990s in the 
shape of “intelligence-led policing”, which evolved into “predictive policing”. Here, the idea was that 
data could be used much more intelligently to focus and direct increasingly pressured surveillance and 
interdiction resources by modelling criminal patterns spatially and temporally. These, in turn, could 
be used to predict future crime activities and patterns. In a world of public sector cutbacks, the 
dividends could be significant.  
The concept made perfect sense, although subsequent experience has shown this process to be more 
difficult than it initially seemed. It may be the case that at the root of the problem is a cultural issue 
within Western policing, whereby senior managers schooled in traditional, pre-information age 
techniques for tackling crime have not yet understood the potential offered by manipulation of data 
for intelligence benefits (with some honourable exceptions). For some of these managers, data 
analysis produces little more than pretty pictures and maps to adorn mandated strategic crime 
reports.  
By the turn of the 21st century, however, the debate has intensified through the seemingly exponential 
rise in available data and the possibilities for analysing it, as metropolitan societies move much more 
resolutely into the information age. This explosion in data is being matched by substantial 
developments in computing power, and in the ability of states and organisations to not only store 
more data, but to run highly sophisticated analytical techniques against them. In policing and in 
intelligence more generally, there is evidence that the possibilities of predictive policing are being 
reappraised.  
Of course, we now know through Snowden’s revelations that the big Signals Intelligence (Sigint) 
agencies on either side of the Atlantic were working away throughout this period to capitalise on the 
new opportunities and expand capabilities to the very limits of computing capability. At the heart of 
the revelations is the question of the scale of data gathering. In the US, the newly exposed Prism 
programme revealed an industrial-scale collection of internet metadata from major commercial 
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internet service providers. Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, the Tempora programme revealed that 
GCHQ was tapping into trunk trans-global fibre optic cables transiting its shores, in order to amass 
enormous databases of international communications activity.  
There are questions here of the intelligence rationale being adopted by the US and UK states (and, 
indeed, undoubtedly by numerous other states). There are two components to this question. First, 
and perhaps most significantly, is the way in which national security conceptualisation and policy have 
changed through the turn of the century, and particularly in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 era. The 
terrorist attacks in the US in September 2001 ushered in the War on Terror, and, with it, an avowedly 
more pre-emptive and offensive-realist security stance in the US and amongst its closest Western 
allies. President Bush’s first State of the Union address after the attacks captured the mood:  
I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and 
closer. …. We can’t stop short. If we stop now–leaving terror camps intact and terror states 
unchecked–our sense of security would be false and temporary. History has called America and 
our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom’s fight. 
(CNN, 2002) 
Here we can see a rationale for a more forward-reaching national security stance, in which the 
transnational dangers of a globalised world are met upstream. From an intelligence-gathering 
perspective, this is likely to mean two things. First, the supposedly transnational nature of threats such 
as contemporary terrorism mean that communications and connections between individuals and 
organisations will be made across global networks. It will not be enough, most probably, to restrict 
interception of communications to limited, domestic datasets, such “targets” and threats are likely to 
be operating in the civil sphere. The connection between terror camps in failed states and terrorist 
attackers in the Western world is likely to be one embedded in particular civilian communities, whose 
communications will pass on public networks rather than in isolated and dedicated military or 
diplomatic channels, as might have characterised the targets of primary interest in the past.  
If our states are to chase-down such targets, therefore, they will need to dip their hands into public, 
civil communications and data footprints. In former President Bush’s terms, such a task was not just a 
nice-to-have, but a matter of duty and responsibility for the world’s greatest power and its closest 
allies to “fight freedom’s fight”. This was a task of the loftiest importance. Thus, the needs and values 
of democratic societies are balanced against the methods with which to deliver security. And the 
equation had changed after 9/11. As the UK Prime Minister at the time, Tony Blair, described it: the 
attacks in New York and Washington had changed at a stroke the “calculus of risk” (Richards, 2012). 
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Needles and haystacks 
The second important component to the post-9/11 change in policy, however, is the methodology 
adopted to tackle the supposedly changed and enhanced threats posed in the new era. In this 
question, states could arguably be accused of using old thinking to tackle a new problem.  
Policing and intelligence organisations will often use the old analogy of searching for needles in 
haystacks. In contemporary society, it is assumed that a very small percentage of individuals are 
plotting to do us serious harm. But those individuals (and their planning) are lost within a vast morass 
of civil society. The trick is to find who they are and to extract them deftly from the welter of innocent 
citizens around them, without compromising democratic norms and expectations in disproportionate 
ways.  
As communications behaviour expands and becomes more complex, however, the haystacks (in terms 
of data generated by modern citizens) start to become much bigger, and much more diverse. Think of 
the way in which our communications behaviour has changed, and particularly the number of 
mechanisms any of us use on a daily basis to communicate with others. Not that long ago, the fixed 
landline telephone was the only method of doing so. Now, many of us use a range of messaging 
applications for different purposes and different circles of people, with the applications sometimes 
numbering into double figures. For the intelligence agencies, each of these channels of 
communication are a potential new haystack in which the sought-after needles may be located.  
There is also a retrospective component which seems to be at the centre of modern security threats 
in metropolitan societies. Intelligence agencies sometimes characterise this as “target discovery” or 
“target development”. Perhaps not unreasonably, when a serious incident occurs such as the bombing 
of marathon runners in Boston or the attack on the Charlie Hebdo magazine offices in Paris, the 
immediate question asked is whether the perpetrators were “on the radar” of the security services. 
With depressing regularity, it usually transpires that the perpetrators were indeed known to the 
authorities in some shape or form, but that investigations had not recognised the immediacy of threat 
or prioritised counter-action highly enough.  
The tactical and indeed political challenge for such agencies in the wake of these incidents is twofold. 
First, there is the immediate tactical question of who else might be closely connected with the 
perpetrators of the attack and who might have been involved in the planning of these, and possibly 
future attacks. It appears that the only way we know of how to achieve this (a point to which I will 
return) is to quickly build the social networks of the perpetrators from available data, and not just 
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those pertaining to the aftermath of the attacks, but ideally those that have already happened in the 
crucial pre-attack planning period. This will allow the authorities to home-in and possibly arrest other 
suspects.  
With Big Data and sophisticated analytical techniques, there is also the theoretical possibility of 
working horizontally rather than vertically, and reaching sideways into the discovery if other networks 
of individuals who are planning attacks but have not yet carried them out. It is assumed that groups 
of individuals planning criminal or terrorist activities interact with one another in especially covert and 
obscure ways, so as to avoid the attention of the authorities. If such specific and unusual patterns of 
communication could be captured as an algorithm, this could be washed against the wider dataset of 
public communications to try to spot groups of individuals behaving in similar ways. This opens up the 
possibility of more pre-emptive and predictive intelligence analysis.  
However, the critics pose the question: is the needle-in-a-haystack approach the wrong thinking for a 
new problem, especially if it entails a massive intrusion into civil liberties through the collection and 
databasing of industrial-scale quantities of public communications data? The first question here is 
partly whether mass “collection” of data can be appropriately characterised as mass “surveillance”. In 
much of the media and commentary about what Snowden revealed, the former is often described as 
the latter (see for example Lyon, 2014, p.3). Florid language suggests that new Big Data capabilities 
being proposed or exercised by the state allow for a panoptic nightmare in which unseen state officials 
sit in a room and examine each and every communication and interaction with the internet made by 
every man, woman and child. In the UK, the Liberal Democrat MP, Julian Huppert, said of the proposed 
Data Communications Bill (which was defeated in the House of Lords on its first pass) that the bill 
would give  “huge powers to the Home Secretary to require information to be kept about every phone 
call you make, text you send, facebook image you like, and anything else.” (Huppert, 2012).  
Such a connecting of everyday activities by you and I with the surveillance activities of the covert state 
is designed to emphasise the supposedly Orwellian and repressive nature of the modern state in a Big 
Data age. The French philosopher, Gilles Deleuze, suggested that there was no longer a difference 
between the toughest and most tolerant of regimes, since, within both, “liberating and enslaving 
forces confront one another” (1992, p.4). The Foucauldian “society of discipline” becomes the “society 
of control”.  
There are a number of risks identified by the critics. At the core of the argument is the basic question 
of “proportionality” (to use the language of the European Convention on Human Rights) when a state 
appears to gather and store the vast majority of the public’s communications, even if (as discussed 
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below) a human eye never looks at more than a fraction of it. The fact is, it could be argued, that the 
data has been gathered and public privacy compromised.  
Furthermore, As Lyon (2014, p.9) suggests:  
The needle-and-haystack argument carries with it a high probability of false positives, which 
do matter immediately and intensely because the likelihood is high of harm to speciﬁc persons. 
The second risk of the needle and haystack approach is therefore that either corruption or 
incompetence, neither of which are unknown in official milieux, could lead to the wrong person being 
criticised, arrested, or worse. Even in less dramatic circumstances, individuals could find their future 
employment prospects severely compromised if they manage to find themselves on the “wrong list”, 
even if the listing happened many years ago. Similarly, insurance could become costly or even 
unattainable for some.  
We can think here of the case of Lotfi Raissi, the Algerian flight instructor who was the first person to 
be arrested in connection with the 9/11 attacks. Information subsequently revealed that basic social 
network analysis, in which Raissi had been in communications contact with most of the 9/11 hijackers, 
had sealed his fate as a suspect. After many months in jail and the threat of dire consequences if the 
US managed to extradite him from London where he had been arrested, Raissi managed to sue the 
government for wrongful arrest and be awarded a six-figure sum in damages.  
Part of the anxiety here arises from comparing commercial applications of Big Data analysis to the 
state security sphere. We know that major corporations are increasingly modelling consumer 
behaviour using large-scale data analysis to good commercial effect. But the science is relatively 
untested at the time of writing and there are instances of things going wrong. The case of Google Flu 
Trends is an interesting one. Here, data derived from search terms entered into Google was used to 
predict the spread of influenza in the US. Despite successful earlier analysis, the 2013 modelling 
drastically overestimated peak flu levels (Butler, 2013). For sure, this will probably lead to further 
refinement and development of the algorithm to ensure better performance, rather than the 
scrapping of the whole approach. But the question could reasonably be asked as to whether the 
application of such techniques in a national security context could not sometimes lead to more dire 
consequences for certain individuals and serious breaches of human rights. Do we know enough about 
these approaches yet to trust them in sensitive security contexts? 
Zwitter argues that the questions posed by Big Data and its technological underpinnings may be 
outrunning the ethicists (2014). If Big Data does indeed mean that the paradigm of intelligence-
gathering is fundamentally changed by the current developments, then ethical questions of what is 
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right and wrong in a modern liberal democracy in this area may have been thrown uncomfortably 
open. What, for example, does a rightful expectation of privacy mean in a world of comprehensive 
social networking?  
The same dilemma could be said to apply to questions of law. In the UK, the parliamentary oversight 
committee, the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) has conducted a wide-ranging Privacy and 
Security Inquiry in the wake of the Snowden leaks. While this process has not yet completed at the 
time of writing, it is likely that one of its more substantive outcomes will be to suggest that the main 
law in the UK governing intelligence-gathering activities, the Regulatory and Investigatory Powers Act 
(RIPA), will need to be reviewed and overhauled, not least as it was drafted during the 1990s when 
modern internet-based communications were only just beginning to emerge at scale.  
RIPA allows for derogation from the relevant parts of the Human Rights Act (HRA) that govern the 
right to privacy, under authorised activities where the interests of national security or threats of 
serious crime are relevant. Oversight of the government’s activities in these areas is provided  by a set 
of independent commissioners (such as the Interception of Communications Commissioner), the ISC, 
and an Investigative Powers Tribunal (IPT) to which complaints of unlawfulness can be made by any 
member of the public.  
As discussed, the government has also tried to put in place a Data Communications Bill, which would 
mandate communications service-providers to store and make available on request communications 
data (that is, metadata rather than communications content) in support of intelligence operations. 
Following the defeat of this Bill in the House of Lords, and in response to a European Court of Justice 
ruling that the 2009 Data Retention Directive was invalid, the UK government passed emergency 
legislation in 2014 called the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act (DRIPA) to address, it said, 
problems of maintaining capability in the face of heightened threats to security from terrorism.  
A number of critics have challenged the effectiveness of these oversight and legislative mechanisms 
in ensuring a proper balance between security and liberty. On the passing of DRIPA, fifteen leading 
technology law experts wrote and open letter to the House of Commons, lamenting a “serious 
expansion of the British surveillance state”, which , they said, was in potential breach of European law 
(The Guardian, 15 July 2014).  
The defeated 2012 Data Communications Bill is regularly referred to as the “Snooper’s Charter” by 
critics. One of the leading critics, and the lynch-pin in opposition to the bill, is the former leader of the 
Liberal Democrats and Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg. He has characterised opposition to the bill 
as being a problem of proportion. While he claims to support the need for strong security in the face 
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of a changing threat, Clegg protests that “it is not a very British thing to confer or imply guilt on the 
whole of the nation by retaining records of every website everyone has visited over the course of a 
year” (BBC, 18 January 2015). Here again we see the conceptual notion that mass collection of data 
(and, in this case, metadata rather than the actual content of messages) compromises the human 
rights of the citizens of a modern liberal democracy, despite the protestations from the security 
services that they are merely amassing the haystacks so that they have a better chance of finding the 
needles. What is right or wrong here is an ethical question, but also a legal one in terms of defining 
and indeed updating the powers of the intelligence agencies.  
It is also the case that the oversight mechanism in the UK is not necessarily trusted by all. The Guardian 
newspaper, which has been one of the primary outlets for Snowden’s leaks, was quick to point out 
that the Investigative Powers Tribunal’s ruling against GCHQ in February 2015 for failing to make 
known to ministers the extent of its use of capabilities revealed by Snowden up to December 2014, 
was not only “unlawful”, but was the first ruling against an intelligence agency in the IPT’s fifteen-year 
existence. Leaving aside asinine debates about the difference between the terms “unlawful” and 
“illegal” (despite repeated implications to the contrary in The Guardian, GCHQ has not yet been found 
to have broken any laws) it is clearly the case in much of the critical coverage of these issues that the 
ISC committee and the IPT lack credibility for being too much a part of the establishment.  
 
Conclusions - countering the critics 
In academic terms, the debate about the ethics of Big Data for intelligence-gathering are somewhat 
complex in their characterisation. It is probably fair to say that critical debates of the “panoptic panic” 
kind are probably in the ascendant, bolstered by widespread media commentary from civil 
libertarians. Underpinning the critical discourse is a fundamental distrust of state agencies to do the 
right thing ethically or indeed legally; a view given extra impetus by the scale and breadth of some of 
the capabilities revealed by Snowden. The critics would probably argue that the state has the whip-
hand as it holds the powers, and can also do so in secret. Were it not for Snowden, argue the critics, 
none of this would have come to light.  
It could be argued, however, that there are some important counter-arguments to place before the 
critics. Firstly, there is much evidence from those with an intimate working knowledge of how the 
intelligence agencies operate – including the ISC committee, for example – that operations are 
conducted with a scrupulous attention to proper authorisation and accountability. Certainly, the IPT’s 
ruling against GCHQ was embarrassing and will cause questions to be asked amongst its management, 
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but the fact remains that there has still been no evidence whatsoever that GCHQ has broken any law 
in any of its recent operations. One of its former directors, Sir David Omand, has written that the 
culture of compliance with the law has become firmly embedded in the agency’s daily working culture 
(Omand, 2012). While the ISC and IPT may be criticised for never (until very recently) delivering any 
verdict critical of the intelligence machinery, it is doing a disservice to the members of those bodies 
to suggest fundamental corruption in their activities. At the same time, bureaucracies do sometimes 
make mistakes.  
The slippery and sometimes deliberate mutation in public discourse of large-scale collection of data 
into “mass surveillance” is misleading and unhelpful. Certainly, there are entirely reasonable questions 
to be asked about proportionality, and we should never lose sight in a liberal democracy of the risks 
of an erosion of our values in the face of creeping surveillance powers. But to suggest that the 
intelligence agencies are scrutinising each and every interaction we make on a daily basis and looking 
for “thought-crimes” is fanciful if not to say ridiculous. There is much evidence to suggest that a tiny 
proportion – less than 1 percent – of all collected data is ever reviewed by a human analyst. Such a 
comprehensive intrusion into privacy for such small returns may have very pertinent ethical questions 
attached to it, but to suggest that these processes are akin to a reborn Stalinist Great Terror or Cultural 
Revolution are historically and morally inaccurate and inappropriate.  
Part of the problem is a technical one, in terms of the best way to find the needles in the haystacks. 
Critics will point out that the traditional methods of databasing vast amounts of data are surely 
outmoded in an age of greatly enhanced analytical tools and capabilities. It must be possible to 
pinpoint targets of interest – when they need to be targeted – in much more focused ways that 
minimise collateral intrusion to the extents that Snowden has described?  
However, experts and insiders will often suggest that there is, as yet, no known better way of finding 
targets within the morass of public communications. Furthermore, key targets can often only be found 
through their connection with other key individuals as and when they surface. And retrospective 
analysis following target discovery is a critical part of the process. Without some form of data 
retention, it is difficult to see how discovery of the planning activities of newly-emerging targets of 
interest can ever be achieved. Without using current techniques, it is difficult to see how we could 
ever answer a question as to the circle of people that the Charlie Hebdo attackers came into contact 
with, when they were planning their attacks. We would only ever be able to look forwards and react 
to the next attack rather than try to pre-empt any nascent attack plans.  
None of this is to say that new solutions to such problems will never be found, which may allow us to 
adopt less intrusive and more effective mechanisms of target discovery. We cannot know what we do 
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not yet know, and the pace at which computing technology is developing clearly means that any 
predictions are unwise. In a sense, this is the promise and opportunity of Big Data: that it will not just 
give us more, but will fundamentally change the way we think about and address such difficult 
questions.  
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